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High tech products come from highly educated societies, where 
families choose quality over quantity in children, causing low fertility, 
hence, population-aging, and labor shortage.  From personal stamina 
and strength, the source of comparative advantages shifts to collective 
effort like research and public communication, and leadership with 
insight, reputation and expertise.  Hundreds of architects can thrive in 
a firm under one star leader.  In particular, for high tech societies 
strong in implementation and communication, agglomerative 
externality benefits fields like entertainment and mass media.  
Additionally, state sponsorship, social commitment and visionary 
policies can nurture historical and cultural endowment.  Again, by 
Linder hypothesis, products of national passion evolve into distinctive 
exports.  With wideband infrastructure, successive presidential 
proclamations on cultural industrial policy, and media support, 
successful Korean TV plays, movies and on-line games have 
demonstrated the four-fold economic principles stated above.  Thus, 
for on-line games, 34 Korean universities established major programs, 
and qualified draftees can substitute game training for military duties.  
A leisure activity soon becomes a national sport.  A key impact may 
be on economic structure: triumphs have invited creative pioneers to 
augment thriving Chaebols. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Korea is a leading high-tech supplier in today‘s world.  It has a very low 
fertility rate, which is typical in East Asia.  It has also adopted a unique and 
successful cultural industrial policy, which is significant for economic 
development.  This paper maintains that all these three facts are related, in 
the context of the demographic transition of a society, and provide much 
food for thought in economic policy making.  Korea is a nation with its 
special historical and cultural heritage, but demographic transition is a 
process facing most economies.  Therefore, in cultural industrial policy, it is 
the demographic forces that make Korea‘s experience relevant for the rest of 
the world.  
Historically, cultural policy in Korea has three motives: (i) the affirmation 
of national identity, which started from the presidency of Syngman Rhee, (ii) 
the serving as an instrument to strengthen an authoritarian regime, as in the 
era of Park, Chun, and Roh, and (iii) the contribution toward national 
economic interest, that was intensified under Kim Dae Jung, in the economic 
trauma of 1998 (Yim, 2002).  With the coming of democracy, cultural policy 
no longer plays its role to uphold the political incumbent.  Both the last and 
the current presidents of Korea, have invoked the promise of a strong Korean 
economy to justify the goal of a strong Korean culture.  It is impressive that 
although over a wide range of issues — including the emotional question of 
how to deal with North Korea — Presidents Roh and Lee disagreed with 
each other, they linked the inspiring goal of national culture to the practical 
concern of economic performance, in nearly identical statements, by 
apparently holistic reasoning. Pragmatically, they carried further the 
promotion of cultural industries like President Kim Dae Jung who regarded 
the cultural industries as significant resources to create national wealth. 
It is to be expected that, when national economic interest coincides with 
some lofty principles, countries wisely choose to emphasize the latter aspect 
in international debates.  Thus, for pharmaceutical inventions, India accepted 
process innovation, but not product innovation, as the basis for patent 
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protection and maintained that human life ought to have a somewhat better 
claim than profit.  Therefore, when against American opposition, Korea 
adopted the screen quota system, requiring Korean movie theaters to show 
domestic films for at least a certain number of days, a simplistic 
interpretation is that Korea‘s culture promotion is simply economic 
nationalism.  To wit, when the French government pursued a similar policy, 
no reference was made about French national wealth.  But this interpretation 
does not seem to be fair, judging from the comprehensiveness of the Korean 
program, the passion to make the Korea‘s own product perfect, and the pride 
Koreans take concerning their artistic achievement.  It seems, at the most, 
economic advantages have reinforced what Koreans would have done 
happily, in any case, to promote their refined and age-old culture. 
This study is not a historical inquiry into the decision process of Korean 
policy makers.  On the other hand, Koreans are a pragmatic people.  They are 
not likely to adopt a policy just because of its lofty objectives, heedless of the 
practical constraints facing all mortals.  As an example, after the Korean 
armistice, President Rhee advocated ‗Marching North‘.  But over his own 
rule of 18 years, President Park, a professional soldier himself, and a person 
nobody has ever regarded as faint in heart, would not make any serious 
attempt to unify the country by the force of arms, whatever the outcome. In 
short, regardless why the Korean government has implemented its current 
cultural industrial policy, this agenda cannot possibly be continued, if it has 
brought about great and enduring disadvantages to the economy.  In 
attempting to treat the Korean experience as a ‗light unto the nations‘, this 
paper would limit the discourse on the more prosaic ground of economic 
reasoning.  Three questions will be addressed: 
 
(i) What are the economic advantages of the Korean cultural industrial 
policy? 
(ii) How have Koreans succeeded in their policy? 
(iii) What is the background against which Korea took such policy 
initiatives? 
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2. A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 
 
As it will be seen, by its thorough nature and its comprehensive scope, the 
current cultural industrial policy of Korea stands in a class all by itself.  
Moreover, in its present form, much of the programs do not yet have a long 
track record.  It appears therefore impossible at the present, to study such a 
program by either an econometric or historical approach.  At the same time, 
like all real life policies, the success or failure of the Korean program will 
certainly be decided, not just by its broad outline alone, but also in its details.  
These latter are so intricate to place the subject beyond the reach of most 
tractable, purely analytic models, or credible calibrating exercise.  In fact, a 
similar point was made in a research monograph partly backed by the Korean 
Development Institute, namely, Stern, Kim, Perkins, and Yoo (1995). 
On the other hand, one can take an ‗ethnographic approach‘ and ask rather 
realistically, where did Korean policies come from.  Unlike policies, say, of 
U.A.E. or some Latin American republics, they are drawn up by Korean 
policy makers, backed by Korean technical staffs, using Korean statistical 
data sources, within Korean policy making organizations, … .  About each of 
these, from books, observations by Japanese economists, and personal 
contacts, enough is known for the current purpose.  In Korea, since the 
beginning of its rapid growth of the 1960s: 
 The research institutes were staffed by economists educated in 
American and European universities, and are quite sophisticated in their 
reasoning (Jones and Sakong, 1980).  They compare favorably to the 
MITI staffs in Post WWII Japan, as depicted by Komiya (1988). 
 The research organizations are well funded and effectively configured, 
relative to those in Taiwan, another high tech supplier in East Asia, with 
a low fertility rate. 
 The statistics data are broadly comparable to those of Taiwan (which 
are regarded as good by foreign researchers). 
 Policy makers are well versed in economies used as benchmarks, such 
as Japan, America, and in the very early days, Taiwan (Stern, Kim, 
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Perkins, and Yoo, 1995). 
 Policy making has been characterized as bold in initiatives, but ready 
for revision (Jones and Sakong, 1980) and admired by Japanese 
researchers like Kikkawa and Hikino (1999). 
Therefore, in trying to make a useful and timely study of Korean policies, 
it is reasonable to assume that such policies are made on the basis of good 
data, informed observations on their ‗benchmark‘ economies, and the 
available principles in the economic literature. 
Section 3 below discusses the nature of the cultural products, and why they 
become promoted so enthusiastically in Korea.  Following that, section 4 
analyzes what it takes to launch these industries successfully. After that, in 
section 5, a systematic review is made regarding the sequence of events 
leading to Korea‘s recent actions.  As conclusion, in section 6, one shifts the 
focus to the international scene, noting that in the time to come, the Korean 
experience is likely to be studied elsewhere in a globalized world, and 
inquiring the natural question: what if all countries adopt cultural industries 
of their own, in the Korean style.  
 
 
3. THE ECONOMICS OF CULTURAL GOOD 
 
3.1. Korean Cultural Goods, Historical and Created 
 
What product qualifies as a cultural good seems to be to the eye of the 
beholder.  For settling disputes, the WTO/GATT arrived at a definition after 
extensive debates, and the result still differs from the listing under the 
Korean Cultural Industry Promotion Act (1999) under Kim Dae Jung.  The 
listed industries include publishing and printing, advertising, film, 
broadcasting, digital content, video, music, animation, design, crafts, 
character, fine arts, and games among many others.  In the beginning, neither 
publishing and printing, nor advertising, nor games appear to have that close 
relationship with the historical Korean identity as compared to the cases of 
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Table 1 Selected Korean Cultural Industry Policies since 1994 
1994 Bureau of Cultural Industry within the Ministry of Culture and Tourism 
(MCT) set up 
1995 Motion Picture Industry Promotion Law enacted 
1995 Sound Records, Video Products and Game Products Act enacted 
1997 The Seoul Studio Complex built up 
1998 Korea IT Promotion XXX (KIPA) set up 
1999 Cultural Industry Promotion Act promulgated 
1999 5-year Plan for Cultural Content Industry set up 
 – Cyber Korea 21 (1999) 
 – Content Korea Vision 21 (2000) 
 – Creative Korea Vision (2004) 
 – Culture Contents Vision 21 (2004) 
1999 Korea Game Promotion Center (KGPC) set up 
1999 Korea Game Creation Support Center set up (renamed as Korea Game 
Industry Agency, KOGIA in 2007) 
1999 Korean Film Commission (KOFIC) reorganized from Korean Motion 
Picture Promotion Corporation (set up in 1973) 
1999 Korea Game Development & Promotion Institute (KGDI) set up 
(reorganized from Korea Game Promotion Center, KGPC)  
1999 Korean Academy of Animation Arts set up 
2000 Cultural Industry Fund established 
2000 Game Academy set up under KGDI 
2001 Korea Culture & Contents Agency set up 
2000 Non-governmental Game Cultural Promotion Council set up 
2004 Content Industries selected as a growth engine for next generation 
2006 Game Industry Promotion Act enacted 
2009 Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) set up, integrating five 
organization: the Korean Broadcasting Institute, the Korea Culture and 
Content Agency, the Korea Game Development and Promotion 
Institute, the Culture & Contents Center, and Digital Contents Business 
Group of the Korea SW Industry Promotion Agency 
Sources: Yim (2005), KOGIA (2007). 
 
films, broadcasting and digital content.  Nonetheless, although publishing 
and printing as well as advertising have received little government attention, 
online games, under the games category, have received massive, multifaceted 
government support, along with films, TV drama, and digital content.  It 
rapidly becomes such a national passion, hence, part of the ‗Korean culture‘!  
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Table 1 shows the sequence of the major Korean cultural industry policy 
measures since the mid 1990s. 
 
3.2. The Demand Characteristics of Cultural Goods 
 
(a) The micro-economic aspects. Cultural goods have the following 
attributes: 
 With an income-elastic demand, their spending share rises with national 
wealth. 
 Much of such products are consumed at all ages, hence retain market 
shares with rising life expectancy. 
 Their use may be habit-forming, so their demand becomes more stable 
over time. 
 Their domestic flavor makes such products less vulnerable to import 
competition. 
 Once they gain reputation, they confer authenticity to local tourism. 
 If quality and reputation grow over time, they may form the basis for 
export. 
(b) The macro-economic aspect.  The gaining of popularity of local 
cultural goods would improve the balance of payment and /or the terms of 
trade for the home country. 
The range of cultural goods often overlaps with part of range of what is 
known as the creative goods.  For some of the grounds covered above, see 
also UNCTAD (2004).  In many cases, cultural goods are supplied by 
monopolistically competitive industries.  The profit margin does not 
necessarily shrink toward zero.  On the other hand, the market demand may 
be threatened by the changes in style.  This weakness is less threatening as 
long as there is an adequate stream of profitable entrants joining the market, 
at all times. 
Figure 1 suggests the success of Korean cultural industrial policy.  It may 
be true that the consumption of cultural industry product will rise as the 
society becomes more affluent.  Two points must be made here, however. 
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Figure 1 Sales of Cultural Contents 
Source: Yu (2007). 
 
First, one might note that over the period covered by figure 1, the rise of 
sales value of cultural goods in the histogram almost parallels the curve 
displaying the ratio of consumption of cultural products to GDP.  The 
implication is that this is not a period of rapid income growth, so therefore 
the gains in sales value seem to be basically substitution among consumption 
goods.  Second, not all cultural goods consumed are Korean, so that the 
increase of sales of Korean cultural goods in the Korean market has much to 
do with the success of the Korean cultural industrial policy. 
From the viewpoint of recent Korean economic history, the crisis of 1997-
1998 was caused by the conjunction of the falling of world market price of 
Korean outputs and the withdrawal of short-term foreign loans borrowed by 
the Korean economy.  Under the cultural industrial policy, the increased 
consumption of Korean outputs in the form of cultural industry products is 
clearly an effective antidote against such a malaise.  This point is even more 
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relevant, when the cultural industry product is habit forming, like on-line 
games (Obstfeld, 1992). 
 
3.3. The Supply Characteristics of Cultural Goods 
 
The foundation for the cultural industries is built upon current creativity 
and past tradition.  But in activities generating knowledge capital, with all 
the relevant externalities involved, certain enabling factors are crucial, for 
such industries to thrive in a modern economy: 
 A technological infra-structure — for instance, the high tech facilities 
for the implementation and distribution of the output 
 The entrepreneurial set-up to secure the sufficient reward to keep the 
enterprise going 
 An effective government to provide the needed institutional support  
More specifically, in an advanced society, there are all the excellent 
opportunities to supply high quality cultural goods to a mass class of users.  
But on the other hand, nothing comes cheap.  In an externality-ridden society, 
to assure that an adequate income stream is forthcoming to sustain the 
creation and delivery of the product, there must an effective government with 
the right objective. 
What makes Korea especially qualified to sustain such cultural industries? 
Korea has the cultural heritage, and the talented performers.  But so are many 
other societies.  The difference is, Korea was already a high tech society 
more highly connected with internet than most other societies,
1)
 with much of 
the infrastructure on hand.  Korea has a core of entrepreneurs, with the export 
experience to handle the global business side of the operation, and finally, 
there is a government with the vision, the commitment and the effective 
organization to carry out industrial policies if it chooses to support the 
current undertaking.  
                                                                
1) In 2009, Korea has the highest household broadband percentages (95%) in the world. 
Taiwan broadband usage is the 5th (81%), Japan the 16th (64%), and US the 20th (60%) 
(http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/06/us-20th-in-broadband-penetration-trails-s-
korea-estonia.ars). 
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4. HOW HAS THE GOVERNMENT SUCCEEDED IN 
PROMOTING THE CULTURAL GOODS? 
 
4.1. The General Principle 
 
In Korea, the promotion of a (new) product is subject to two different 
precepts: 
 
(i) The Schumpeter Hypothesis, under which the pioneer needs protection.  
(ii) The Law of Arrow, under which, monopoly incurs inefficiency. 
 
The essence of policy design is to find the proper balance between these 
two influences.  Thus, although Hong Kong has produced movies winning 
both critical and commercial success, there is not a cultural policy and hence 
no stable environment, so the cinema industry can easily suffer in bad times.  
Likewise, in the Soviet period, Russia did produce a sequence of 
masterpieces, backed by a state which spared nothing to deliver such show 
pieces.  But lacking market pressure, the average quality of Soviet Russia 
movie was not what it should be, to say nothing of the cost-effectiveness of 
its production.  Many talented would-be producers did not have the 
opportunity to make their mark. 
In general, Korea industrial policy may be distinguished by three 
characteristics: 
 
(i) Forceful policy statement from the national leadership. 
(ii) Consistent commitment by successive administrations on long term 
priorities.  
(iii) Sensitive to the ideal of promoting ‗national champions‘. 
 
Perhaps due to the nature of the cultural industries, but also perhaps 
because of the reactions against the business groups as putative culprits for 
the 1997-1998 Crisis, a new element emerged by the turn of the millennium.  
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In launching the cultural industrial policy, the leading roles are now played 
by individual artists, and not the large studios, like in America or Japan, nor 
the state agencies like under the former Soviet Russia. 
 
 4.2. An Example 
 
The development of the on-line game stands out as a case showcasing the 
Korean approach. 
Before discussing what on-line game is and how Korean industrial policy 
is involved, it is desirable to briefly discuss its characteristics: 
 This is a ‗big‘ industry, judging from 2008 data, in the number of 
players, in domestic market, and in industry export. The worldwide 
players were 500 million, more than ten times of the Korean population. 
The domestic market was 2.9 billion dollars, not a trivial number. 
Export of the industry was 10 million dollars, more than four times of 
the export of Korean movies. 
 It is a fast-growing industry.  For both major typed of games, the 
‗casual‘ game and the Massive Multiplayer On-line Role-Playing Game 
(MMORPG), the growth rates are around 29% in 2006 and 17% in 2007. 
 It is a complex game, where players interact over the internet in virtual 
setting with chosen characters which develop under their control, within 
certain designed theme. 
 It is a Korean-dominated game in which the Korean market ranks larger 
than the Chinese, then the American and then Japanese and European. 
 It is a game supported by the government in various ways as explained 
later. 
 It is a well-thought out game, with low entry cost to attract the customer 
(in comparison with the Video Game), but played over a special server 
which is totally controlled by the company.  It is culture neutral 
(complementary to TV-drama and movie that are Asia-centric), habit-
forming (where each theme may last two years), and has built-in 
opportunities for improvement for the content.  It offers fantasy for the 
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player to immerse in, also chances to boost their ego with contests and 
honors.  It allows for opportunities to make money by selling in-game 
peripherals. 
Korea supports this industry with various policy measures: 
(1) At the industry level, it sets up the country-wide internet connection, 
and creates the legal and regulatory base, with the Korea Game 
Industry Agency (1999) for regulation, and the designation of certain 
game development venture companies as military appointment 
companies, so that working in these firms can be counted as enlistment.  
It introduces the relevant software technology by contacting expert 
from abroad at the Soft Expo, and transfer from ETRI, the government 
research institute.  
(2) At the firm level, it sets up Game Scenario and Development Contests 
so that the winners can receive training under the On-line Game 
Incubator Program. 
(3) At the level of workers, the government arranges department programs 
for game development at 13 graduate schools, 34 undergraduate 
colleges and 3 colleges, beside a Digit Contents Academy (2000). 
(4) At the level of finance, it provides funding for Digit Content, and 
facilitates foreign direct investment from abroad. 
(5) At the level of specific transactions, it assists the export drives, helps to 
predict market fashion change in game themes, and provides support to 
design new game themes. 
Note that in table 1 in the previous section, all items of industrial cultural 
policy since 2000 are related to some degree to the on-line game industry. 
Remarkably, this new stage of Korean industrial policy is entirely 
independent from any reliance from the influence of the business groups. 
 
 
5. AGAINST THE DEMOGRAPHIC BACKDROP 
 
Three global mega trends loom behind the developed and developing 
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societies: 
A. Technology – in two aspects:  
A1. From agrarian to industrial to a service dominated society 
A2. From light industry, heavy industry and high tech (hard-softwares and 
content) 
B. Education  
From literacy to elementary, middle education to college and post-
graduate schooling 
C. Demographic transition – in three aspects:2) 
C1. (In flow) From the falling of mortality rate to the falling of fertility 
rate 
C2. (In stock) Toward graying and aging society  
C3. (In structure) From extended to nuclear family and loosening family 
bound 
These three strands interact, forming complex but alternative causal links 
even among the four Confucian societies: Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Chinese 
Mainland. 
In briefest outline, what came to pass is that as technology progress 
accelerated in the mid-20th Century, societies with high literacy, but low 
income and late industrial development became the destination of 
outsourcing, starting from Japan‘s serving as the off-shoring supply base for 
America during the Korean War.  Technology transfer brought the rapid 
Japanese economic recovery, then high growth, causing the sharp labor 
shortage, and rising education among Japan‘s youth, and made the traditional, 
labor intensive industries non-sustainable.  Migration of such industries 
started first to Taiwan and Hong Kong, and a little later to Korea (Kojima, 
1978; Ozawa, 1979).  Kaohsiung Export Zone in Taiwan and Masan Free 
Trade Zone in Korea soon emerged, with great success.  As stated by Dr. 
Nam Duck Woo (1997), in view of the impending competition from 
economies with even lower wages, Korea placed industry upgrading as the 
                                                                
2)  For detail, see Appendix for the population pyramids of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China in 
1950-2005. 
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national priority.  The more accommodating approach of Taiwan to 
subcontracting was decisively rejected in Korea (Stern et al., 1995), 
notwithstanding the latter‘s success in overtaking Taiwan at Masan, for the 
Heavy Chemical Industry Drive.   At a somewhat milder pace, Taiwan also 
followed a similar path.  During this time, education attainment has risen and 
fertility fallen in both Korea and Taiwan, due to delayed marriage in an 
industrializing society also the income-elastic demand for education for those 
becoming affluent.  With the energy crisis and the microelectronic revolution, 
together with the vertical disintegration of the high tech sector, both Korea 
and Taiwan shifted again intro the electronics industry, away from the heavy 
industries.  The somewhat faster pace of industry upgrading made Korea to 
rely more on the heavily leveraged business groups, causing Korea to suffer 
somewhat more than Taiwan during the Financial Crisis of 1997-1998.  The 
reform of China intensified competition in the world market For Korea‘s loss 
of much of the American market, see Kim (2000).  The price for DRAMs has 
fluctuated widely, hurting Korea, and the profit margin has become paper 
thin for Taiwan (Tung and Wan, 2007).  For Korea‘s shifting toward the 
cultural industries, see figure 1. 
If college enrollment rate is an indication, then the Korean society clearly 
marches at the forefront of its neighbor, Japan (figure 2).  Within this 
kaleidoscopic development, the most relentless and potentially poignant 
force is no doubt the demographic, as the Westernized societies apparently 
rushing toward the irreversible demographical (if not politico-military) 
subsidence, surrounded by a sea of the more traditional cultures (which reject 
all Western or liberal influences), at a pace even faster than the Western societies. 
While the following thoughts are totally speculative, common sense 
predicts that presumably, within two generations, the hard-wired instinct for 
collective, cultural self-preservation of these pragmatic, long-surviving 
societies would cause some dramatic and fundamental reorientation to usher 
in a demographic turn-around.  Judging from the decisive and organized 
manner with which the Korean society has met challenges in the past, it is 
entirely possible that some far reaching social development may emerge there, 
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Figure 2 Tertiary Education, Korea vs. Japan 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008). 
 
solving the demographic conundrum. 
In any case, before then, when hunger, disease and privation become a 
thing of the past to an affluent but rapidly aging, post-industrial society, the 
adoption of a public policy by Korea centered on cultural industries cannot 
be simply construed as something merely relevant for economic national 
interest. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The success of the Korean cultural industrial policy has met some 
resistance from its Asian neighbors as late comers.  The natural question is 
what if all countries emulate Korea‘s success.  Taking a long view, the 
situation seems to be much more reassuring.  As the world becoming more 
affluent, there will be more purchasing power from a broader range of 
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countries for the continuing refining product of Korea‘s cultural industries, 
so that even when countries like Vietnam may gain more domestic market 
share, from their own local products, cultural diversity will be to the benefit 
of everyone, as the rise of national music from various European countries 
has demonstrated, in the past two centuries.  Of course, not all countries are 
likely to excel in the same type of music all the time, but that is just what 
David Ricardo showed in international trade, two centuries ago.  There are 
gains from trade, when a country participates in the world market and 
specializes, based on its comparative advantage.  It was Grandmont and 
MacFadden (1972) who showed decisively, that this is true, not for one 
country which joins the world trade, but for trade opens to all countries 
initially in autarky. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 Population Pyramids of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China 
(1950-2005) 
Notes: 1) Numbers shown for each year are the % of those aged 15-24 in total population by 
sex, 2) In Taiwan, male % in 1960 is underestimate. 
Sources: 1) UN, World Population Prospects, 2008 revision (http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp? 
panel=2), 2) Taiwan data from DGNBAS. 
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